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Abstract—Delivering ubiquitous services to various users and 
devices through heterogeneous networks is a major aim in next 
generation networks.  The delivery should be efficient and secure.  
The support and integration of security, Quality of Service (QoS) 
and mobility management (MM) in access networks become 
parts of the essential issues. An Enhanced Node (EN) with a 
network sub-layer is proposed here to achieve this integration. 
The architectural framework with ENs located in the IP-based 
access networks is presented. The focus of this paper is to 
investigate the challenges of integrating security with QoS and 
MM, notably the threats and requirements, based on this 
framework. The solutions are also proposed to provide the 
authenticated and authorized access control and to secure the 
handover process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the development of Bluetooth, Wifi, WiMAX, Ultra 
Wide Band (UWB) technologies, ubiquitous access comes 
closer to reality. However, for the operator, delivery of 
ubiquitous services today poses many practical challenges [1]. 
From the network perspective, the key barrier to accessing 
ubiquitous services arises from the need for security and 
managing delivery of multiple services within different 
Quality of Service (QoS) environments through multiple 
heterogeneous networks [1]. It is therefore essential that 
different delivery networks should be empowered to operate in 
a cooperative manner. The presence of intelligence and inter-
connection among intelligent entities in such network pose 
great challenges. Particularly, in order to provide ubiquitous 
services to the users securely, intelligent entities are required 
to deliver the security information within the access network 
and across different access networks.  
II. THE BASIC ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK 
To address the challenges posed by ubiquitous services, the 
concept of network support sub-layer, which consists of 
elements of security, QoS and mobility management (MM) 
with radio resource management (RRM) hooks, is proposed. 
The nodes with the support sub-layer are referred to as 
enhanced nodes (ENs). 
A. Enhanced Nodes 
1) Functionalities of the Enhanced Nodes 
 
Figure 1.  Security related enhanced nodes  
The network support sub-layer is located in a small number 
of ENs in a network. The EN can be an access router (AR), 
gateway, anchor point, etc. Such selected ENs can be used in 
the heterogeneous networks comprising security/QoS/MM 
aware and unaware access networks [1]. With the help of ENs, 
integration of security, QoS and MM can be achieved. 
Integration, in this context, incorporates both horizontal 
integration between the various service concepts that exist in 
the disparate networks, and vertical integration, where the 
support of security, QoS and MM in the various participating 
networks is a key factor in end-to-end performance [1]. 
2) Security Related Functions in Enhanced Nodes 
The security related ENs are basically normal mobility 
agents enhanced by specific security functionalities. Fig.1 
shows the components and the services provided by the 
security related EN. The dotted arrow shows the 
corresponding services provided by the entity. Normally, the 
security related EN acts as both of the security entity and the 
mobility agent. As a security entity, it connects to the AAA 
servers and the ARs. The authenticated access control and the 
secured handover services can be provided by the security 
entity. As a mobility agent, it connects to the mobile nodes 
(MN) and the ARs. It deals with the handover signalling and 
the basic Mobile IP signalling. 
B. The Architectural Framework 
Fig.2 shows the architectural framework which our work is 
based on. Two IP-based access networks with the similar 
infrastructure are presented. More than one EN with the 
network sub-layer is located within one access network and 
they communicate with each other via signalling. There is one 
AAA server within each network, which is located close to the 
ENs to help delivering secured services to the MNs. The 
dotted line shows the connection between AAA server and 
other entity in the network. We also assume that one gateway 
is located in each access network as an interface with the 
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external IP network. The home network, with home agent (HA) 
and AAA server, needs to be involved when the information 
from the home domain is required.   
III. SECURITY THREATS, REQUIREMENTS AND OVERVIEW OF 
THE SOLUTIONS 
A. General Security Threats 
As defined in [2], network security threats are typically 
divided into passive and active attacks, which are then 
subdivided into other types of threats. Based on the framework 
presented before, we are aiming to solve the following threats: 
1) Eavesdropping 
The adversary may monitor transmissions for message 
content at the network level. For example, when a MN is 
communicating with a correspondent node (CN), an adversary 
could eavesdrop to the conversation and learn some useful 
data such as the MN’s address, even when the meaningful data 
are encrypted. 
2) Masquerading 
The adversary may impersonate as an authorized user and 
thereby gain certain unauthorized privileges. This includes the 
Man-In-The-Middle attacks. For example, an adversary could 
impersonate as a legitimate MN to access the network and to 
perform handover. 
3) Message Modification 
The adversary may alter a legitimate message in an 
unauthorized manner by deleting, adding to, changing, or 
reordering it. For example, an adversary could modify the 
important signalling messages, such as the binding update 
(BU), if they are not properly secured.  
4) Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
An entity fails to perform its proper function or acts in a 
way that prevents other entities from performing their 
functions. The adversary may prevent, or prohibit the normal 
use of communication facilities. For example, an adversary 
could repeat the QoS-conditionalised BUs in a path to book 
out all the available resources so that the path will run out of 
resources for any legitimate requests. 
B. Specific Security Requirements 
Based on the general security threats, a specific set of 
security requirements for ubiquitous services are derived.  
1) Network Access Control 
Access control makes sure that the unauthorized users are 
denied network access, while the legitimate users are granted 
the network access that they are authorized to use. The MN 
needs to be authenticated and authorized before it can enter 
the access network. 
2) Authentication 
Authentication is the process of verifying an identity 
claimed by or for a system entity. The MN needs to be 
authenticated for the services it requests, such as the handover. 
3) Protection of the Handover Signalling 
It is  required to secure signalling involved in  the  handover 
 
Figure 2.  The architectural framework  
procedures, such as the BUs. So that the adversary can not by 
any means gain or even modify useful information by listening 
to the handover conversation.  
4) Availability/Prevention of DoS 
Availability ensures that network resources/services, such 
as bandwidth, are always available. It can also prevent the 
adversary from disturbing or misusing the network services 
leading to a DoS attack. The MN needs to be authenticated 
before sending out the QoS-conditionalised BU to make sure it 
is not an adversary trying to reserve the resources. 
5) Support Efficient Handovers 
It is necessary that the security mechanisms have minimal 
negative effect on the registration and handover procedures. 
Therefore, the integration of security and MM is required.  
C. Overview of the Proposed Solutions 
The solutions are provided to accomplish the security 
requirements, namely the authenticated access control scheme 
and the secured handover process mechanism. The 
authenticated access control scheme provides MN the 
authenticated and authorized network access. It prevents 
unauthorized use of the network resources, such as an 
adversary accessing the network by masquerading as a 
legitimate user. Also, authentication and registration are 
completed in one sequential signalling, which integrates 
security with MM. The secured handover process mechanism 
authenticates the MN before the handover and provides the 
MN secured handover by securing signalling involved, such as 
BUs.  
IV. BACKGROUND ON THE MOBILITY PROTOCOLS 
Several mechanisms, such as Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 
(HMIPv6) and Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6), 
have been proposed to reduce the handover latency and the 
packets loss in Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [3]. We assume HMIPv6 
as the default mobility agent protocol. FMIPv6 is also used to 
enhance the fast handovers between different ENs domains.  
A. Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) 
It is anticipated that a few protocols will be widely 
deployed to enhance MIPv6 with mechanisms for faster 
handovers [4] [5]. HMIPv6 is one of these proposals. The 
main idea of HMIPv6 is to introduce Mobility Anchor Points 
(MAPs). MAPs not only help to improve the handover rate but 
also can reduce the amount of signalling related to mobility. 
The goal in a domain oriented mobility management scheme 
like HMIPv6 is to limit the signalling messages locally within 
the region. That is due to the fact that BUs are sent from MN 
directly to MAP rather than HA, meaning that MN’s exact 
position is hidden from outer region. Thus the signalling 
messages in macro level get reduced as long as the MN stays 
in a specific region. In such a structure the MN has two “Care-
of-Addresses” (CoA). The MN registers the obtained address 
from its serving AR with the MAP. This address is called 
“On-Link CoA” (LCoA), also referred to as local CoA. The 
MAP binds the LCoA with its own address which is called 
“Regional CoA” (RCoA). The source address of outgoing 
packets from the MN to the outer domain carries the MAP’s 
address. Therefore, the peer nodes just know the MAP and the 
incoming packets are addressed to the MAP as well. Then, 
MAP, according to its binding table distributes the packets 
among the visiting MNs of its domain [6]. Fig. 3 illustrates an 
example of the use of MAP in a visited network.  
B. Fast Handover for Inter enhanced nodes Domains 
In FMIPv6, even though a MN moves into a new domain, 
before it registers its new CoA (NCoA) to the HA/CN, packets 
sent from the HA/CN are delivered to the previous AR (PAR) 
first. Then they are tunnelled to the new AR (NAR) by the 
PAR and finally arrive at the MN. Once the MN completes the 
registration of its NCoA to the HA/CN, packets will arrive at 
the MN directly via the NAR [3].  
With HMIPv6 as the default mobility protocol, EN also 
plays the role of MAP. HMIPv6 and FMIPv6 are integrated 
here to further enhance the fast handover. To achieve the 
integration, ENs need to have prior knowledge of the 
surrounding ENs and the location of MN. For example, the 
MN’s new location needs to be temporarily registered with the 
previous EN (PEN). This can be done by the fast handover 
registration. When a MN moves into a new EN (NEN) domain, 
the MN obtains a new RCoA and sends a BU to the PEN 
requesting it to forward packets to the MN’s new RCoA. Due 
to the intelligence, the PEN can be configured to forward 
packets to the NEN. And the packets finally arrive at the 
LCoA associated with the AR that is geographically adjacent 
to AR on the boundary of the PEN domain. This will allow for 
a smooth inter-EN handover as it allows the MN to continue to 
receive packets while updating its HA and, potentially, CN. 
Fig. 4 shows the signalling involved in inter-EN domains 
fast handover. Depending on whether a Fast Binding 
Acknowledgement (FBAck) is received or not on the previous 
link, there are two modes of operations, namely the predictive 
mode and the reactive mode. In the predictive mode, after the 
information for a potential handover is exchanged between 
MN and AR, the handover is triggered. The MN initiates a 
Fast Binding Update (FBU) to the PEN, instructing it to 
redirect its traffic towards the NEN. The PEN and NEN also 
exchange information and negotiate with  each other regarding  
 
Figure 3.  Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 domain [4] 
 
Figure 4.  Fast handovers for the inter-EN domains 
the MN’s handover. The PEN then sends a FBAck message to 
both of the MN and the NEN as the response to FBU. 
Afterwards, the packets addressed to MN can be tunnelled 
from the PEN to the NEN. After the registration is finished, 
the packets can be delivered between the MN and the NEN as 
usual as in HMIPv6 specification. The reactive mode operates 
in a similar way with FBAck received in NEN’s link, as 
shown in Fig.4. 
V. SOLUTIONS 
A. The Authenticated Access Control Scheme 
The method to provide authenticated access for IPv6 
supported mobility was proposed in [7]. A similar concept 
with a few modifications is applied here in our framework. 
HMIPv6 is used here as the default mobility protocol and the 
EN has the functionalities of MAP.  
1) Overview of the Mechanism 
Fig.5 shows the mechanism to integrate fast handovers with 
the authenticated and authorized access. The AAA servers are 
located in both of the visited network and the home network. 
Also, EN acts as the AAA client, which is connected to the 
AAA foreign server (AAAF). In HMIPv6, the MN must 
perform the BU to MAP for each RCoA before registration 
with its HA. The MN may also send a BU to its current CNs. 
Therefore, it takes three round-trip-times (RTTs) to finish 
registrations.  As illustrated in Fig.5, we integrate the security 
messages with the BUs, including the BUs to EN and to HA, 
in order to reduce the RTTs involved in the registration and 
authentication processes. 
The MN first sends the security combined BUs, which 
include the BUs to both of the EN and HA together with the 
authentication request, to the EN. The EN initiates an AAA 
request including the BU (only the BU to HA) to AAAF, 
which then forwards the request to AAA server in the home 
domain (AAAH). With the help of HA, the authentication 
request can be processed locally by AAAH. At the same time, 
the BU is sent over to the HA by AAAH. Then, the AAAH 
forwards the security combined binding acknowledgement 
(BA), which includes the AAA response and the BA from HA, 
to the AAAF. The EN then decides whether the MN can be 
granted the network access, and sends the BAs, including the 
BAs from EN and HA, over to the MN. The MN registers with 
its current CN afterwards, if necessary. 
The EN plays an essential role in this procedure in terms of 
controlling both of the registration signalling and the 
authenticated network access. Also, the RTTs resulted from 
registrations are reduced by performing two BUs in one 
sequential process.  
2) Details on the Signalling 
Fig.6 shows the details on authenticated network access 
signalling. The common Challenge/Response authentication 
method for MIPv4 defined in [8] is applied here. The EN 
provides MN with a challenge on behalf of the HA through an 
extension to a Router Advertisement message (RA). The MN 
hashes the challenge with a pre-shared secret key with the 
home network, and sends the challenge together with the 
hashed result over to the home network via the AAA 
infrastructure and waits for the response from the home 
domain. 
Since AAAH can perform the registration with HA on 
behalf of the MN, AAAH constructs an alternative BU 
(BU_alt) message that can result in the same registration by 
MN’s BU to the HA (BU_ha) would give. The AAAH can 
also reconstruct a BA from the HA (BA_ha) message from the 
alternative BA (BA_alt) in a similar way. 
 
Figure 5.  Integration of fast handovers with authenticated and authorized 
access control 
 
Figure 6.  signalling for the authenticated access control scheme  
 
Figure 7.  Overview of the key generation procedures 
It should be noted that some extensions need to be made on 
the HMIPv6 messages in order to achieve the sequential 
registration and authentication. For example, the challenge for 
each EN needs to be delivered to MNs through the option of 
the RA message. The messages transmitted between EN and 
AAAH, including the AAA messages, BU and BA, are all 
wrapped into the attribute-value-pairs (AVPs) defined for the 
DIAMETER MIPv6 application in [9] and delivered through 
the AAA infrastructure. The information transmitted between 
MN and EN is delivered like a BU to the EN (BU_en) 
message with the additional information appended in the 
message options.  
B. The Secured Handover Process Mechanism 
It was proposed in [10] a key management protocol to 
generate handover keys to secure FMIPv6 signalling. With 
some modifications and extensions, this method is applicable 
to other protocols such as HMIPv6. We propose a similar 
mechanism to secure the handover process for our framework. 
The secured handover process mechanism authenticates the 
MN before the handover takes place and also protects 
handover by securing the signalling between the two entities 
involved (MN and AR, or MN and EN) using a handover key 
(HK).  The secured handover process includes two procedures:  
key generation and securing handover messages. 
1) Overview of the Key Generation Procedures 
Fig. 7 shows the basic key generation procedures. The 
handover key server (HKS), which cooperates with the MN to 
generate a HK, is collocated with the AAAF server. The MN, 
upon attaching to an AR, sends a handover key request 
(HKReq.) message to the AR. After validating the MN’s CoA,       
AR forwards the HKReq. message to EN. The EN then 
initiates an AAA request encapsulating the payloads of 
HKReq. message. After successful authentication and 
authorization using the Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
carried in the AAA request, the HKS generates the HK and 
sends an AAA response message over to the EN. Keying 
materials and HK are included in this message. The EN 
decrypts the HK and forwards the HK with the keying 
information to the AR in a handover key response (HKResp.) 
message. After receiving the keying materials from AR, the 
MN then generates the HK.   
2) Details of Key Generation Signalling 
To expand the messages shown in Fig.7, the detailed 
signallings are illustrated in Fig.8. We assume that MN and 
HKS share a pre-shared key (PSK), which is used to generate 
the HK. The HKReq. message includes the MN’s CoA, a 
nonce generated by MN (N1) and the pseudo random function 
(PRF) algorithm that MN chooses to use for key generation. 
Also, MN includes a MAC of the message fields in a MN-
HKS MAC option. The value of the MN-HKS MAC is 
calculated using a handover integrity key (HIK), which is the 
key derived from the PSK and shared between MN and HKS. 
Therefore, by validating the MN-HKS MAC, HKS can 
authenticate the MN and perform authorization for the 
handoffs before deriving a unique and fresh session key (HK). 
After successful authentication and authorization, the 
 
Figure 8.  Signalling for the key generation procedures 
 
Figure 9.  The use of handover key in reactive mode of the fast handover  
HKS sends an AAA response message, including the MN-
HKS MAC, a nonce generated by HKS (N2), and the HK. 
Upon receiving the AAA response, EN decrypts the HK and 
initiates a HKResp. message, including the keying information 
from HKS. After receiving a successful response message, the 
AR stores the HK received from the EN and generates a MN-
AR MAC option, which is calculated using the HK. The AR 
then sends the keying materials with the MN-AR MAC over 
to MN. Using the keying materials obtained, the MN derives 
the HK and validates the MN-AR MAC using that.  
3) Secure the Handover using the Handover Key 
a) Intra Enhanced Node Domain Handover 
In the key generation procedure, the MN has already been 
authenticated and authorized to perform the handover. In the 
intra EN domain handover, the registration messages are 
localised within the EN domain, which means in the route of 
MN-AR-EN. Therefore, when the MN moves between ARs, 
the BU and BA can be secured using the HK between the MN 
and the AR pair (or even the MN and the EN pair).  
b) Inter Enhanced Nodes Domains Handover 
The fast handover signallings as described in section IV B, 
are secured by HK. In predictive mode of the fast handovers, 
HK is simply used to secure the FBU and the FBAck. Fig.9 
shows how to use the HK to secure the fast inter ENs domains 
handover in reactive mode. After sending out the Unsolicited 
Neighbor Advertisement (UNA) message, the MN sends FBU 
with the HK over to NEN. The NEN then forwards the (FBU, 
HK) pair to PEN. With the HK formerly generated, the PEN 
can validate FBU. The HK can also be used in a similar way 
to secure the QoS-conditionalised BUs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A number of enhancements for MIPv6 are proposed to 
reduce the handover latency and packet loss rate, such as 
HMIPv6, FMIPv6 and the combination of both referred to as 
FHMIPv6, etc. Compared to these protocols, the introduction 
of ENs in our architecture has the advantage of regulating 
traffic flow to avoid network bottlenecks, which solves the 
problem of depending on a single MAP for all users of the 
domain in HMIPv6. Compared to FMIPv6, the handover 
latency and packet loss rate can also be further reduced due to 
the intelligence of ENs. Also, the EN provides an anchor point 
as part of the AAA hierarchy for the security signalling, which 
means the security functionalities can be centrally 
administrated. The EN also provides compatibility with QoS, 
which integrates security with QoS in a common framework to 
minimize the negative cross issues. The focal point of this 
paper is to provide two security solutions for the EN based 
infrastructure. The authenticated access control scheme aims 
at authenticating and authorizing the MN when it crosses the 
networks, while the secured handover process mechanism 
provides the MN secured micro-mobility and macro-mobility 
handoffs within one access network. Simulations by OPNET 
will be carried out to evaluate the efficiency of the solutions. 
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